Objective Moral Values Don’t Exist: Mackie Part 1

Mackie on Objectivity/SubjectivityMackie’s Arguments from Relativity and Queerness Notes and Thoughts on J. L. Mackie’s Ethics:  Inventing Right and Wrong, Part 1IntroMackie represents the position in meta-ethics known a moral skepticism.  As you may have guessed, his position is typified by a strong belief in a god and objective moral values.  Jk. lol.  Actually, moral skepticism […]

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Hurrah/Boo Theory of Ethics: A. J. Ayer Part 2

The Case for EmotivismRecapIn part 1 we looked at Ayer’s arguments against the idea that any value assertion  (e.g. “x is good/right/bad”) by subjectivism, utilitarianism, or absolutism is not reducible to any testable claim, and is therefore meaningless, except as expressions of emotions of approval or disapproval.  So, for example, if I say “premarital sex is baaaaaaaaaaaad” […]

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Maybe It’s Good that Helping Old Ladies Across The Street Brings About Happiness? But, Is It Good That It’s Good?

G. E. Moore’s Open Question ArgumentReviewIn the previous post we took a look at G. E. Moore’s naturalistic fallacy which, if you recall, is (short version):  (1)  Simple ideas/concepts cannot be defined by their properties because then they would be the same as their properties.  Eg.  ‘Yellow’ cannot be defined as ‘bright’ because ‘yellow’ and ‘bright’ […]

Read More Maybe It’s Good that Helping Old Ladies Across The Street Brings About Happiness? But, Is It Good That It’s Good?