Chalmers’ Zombies and The Hornswoggle Problem: Patricia Churchland

Context and IntroductionIn this article Patricia Churchland is arguing against David Chalmers’ assertion that the physical sciences, including contemporary disciplines like neuroscience, will never be able to explain consciousness.  More specifically, they will never be able to explain the hard problem of consciousness: how and why physical processes give rise to subjective experience.  Otherwise stated, […]

Read More Chalmers’ Zombies and The Hornswoggle Problem: Patricia Churchland

Brain Damage, Mind Damage, and Dualism (Phelan, Mandelbaum, and Nichols)

Introduction and Context:In describing what philosophy does, I’ve heard Prof. Todd Jones (of UNLV) say “philosophy is usually about one of two things:  Things that are so abstract and obscure that most people wouldn’t bother to think about them, and things that are so obvious that most people wouldn’t bother to think about them.”  Substance […]

Read More Brain Damage, Mind Damage, and Dualism (Phelan, Mandelbaum, and Nichols)

Descartes and Philosophy of Mind: The Conceivability Argument and the Divisibility Argument

Introduction and Context:Watch the Video first: http://youtube.googleapis.com/v/9CqbO_5FKRc&source=uds https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9CqbO_5FKRc So, is the brain the mind?  Is the mind the brain?  Are they separate things?  If so, are you your brain or your mind?  Or are you somehow both but they aren’t the same thing?  Are you confused? Poor Karl.  Lets try to help him clear up […]

Read More Descartes and Philosophy of Mind: The Conceivability Argument and the Divisibility Argument