Chalmers’ Zombies and The Hornswoggle Problem: Patricia Churchland

Context and IntroductionIn this article Patricia Churchland is arguing against David Chalmers’ assertion that the physical sciences, including contemporary disciplines like neuroscience, will never be able to explain consciousness.  More specifically, they will never be able to explain the hard problem of consciousness: how and why physical processes give rise to subjective experience.  Otherwise stated, […]

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Epiphenomenal Qualia, The Knowledge Argument (Aka Mary’s Room): Frank Jackson

Introduction and ContextFrank Jackson (no relation to the late Michael Jackson) argues that even if you knew all the physical facts about a conscious experience and what brings it about, you would still be missing information.   That is, supposing you knew everything that happens in the brain–down to the neuron–when sees the color red […]

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Descartes and Philosophy of Mind: The Conceivability Argument and the Divisibility Argument

Introduction and Context:Watch the Video first: http://youtube.googleapis.com/v/9CqbO_5FKRc&source=uds https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9CqbO_5FKRc So, is the brain the mind?  Is the mind the brain?  Are they separate things?  If so, are you your brain or your mind?  Or are you somehow both but they aren’t the same thing?  Are you confused? Poor Karl.  Lets try to help him clear up […]

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