Official Website for Amitabha Palmer
Notes and Thoughts on Parfit’s “On What Matters”, Vol. 2, Chapter on NormativityOh! Before we start…Welcome my 100th published post! That’s a lot of rambling…Thank you for reading my stuff. Here are a couple of fun facts about my blog: Total number of visits 6787Most visits in a month 548 in Feb 2012Strangest Stat: I’ve had […]
Read More Normativity and Misunderstandings: Parfit(apology–I haven’t proof read this yet)Yo, check it. I think I might actually have my paper topic for metaFX. Stop. That would be the best DJ name for a philosopher ever, DJ metaFX. Anyway, I is going to talk about whever der is such ting as normativity in reasons–that is, whether there’s such a ting […]
Read More Normative Truth: Good and Bad Reasons. (Parfit)Ok, it’s term paper season. This means my posts will become infrequent and the posts that I do make will be mostly me trying to figure stuff out for papers. Without further ado, lets get into my ramblings on Parfit’s notion of normative reasons.Background on Parfit’s Normative ReasonsIn contemporary meta-ethics people talk about “reasons for […]
Read More Random Notes On Moral Reasons (Parfit)Other Mackie ArticlesMackie on Subjectivity vs ObjectivityMackie Intro and Second vs First Order Ethics OverviewDo objective moral values or principles exist? Or are we dancer? When someone says, “it’s wrong to do x” or “you ought not to do x” it seems as though they are referring to something objective about or in the act. That is, we […]
Read More The Arguments from Queerness and Relativity (Mackie Part 2)Holy Crap! It’s 4:10am and I’m going to start this now? Am I insane? Yup. Actually, I have to do a presentation on this articles in 2 days so I’m forcing myself to get through the entire article tonight so tomorrow I can pick and choose the parts I’ll use for my presentation. I should […]
Read More Want to Discover Moral Truth? Part 3 How to Be a Moral Realist by Richard BoydOverviewIn part 1 we looked at how Boyd draws an analogy between scientific realism and moral realism. The first parallel is that there is a progressively recursive relationship between theory and experience. The second is that there is a progressively recursive relationship between theory and method. Check out part 1 if you’d like further elaboration…I’ve […]
Read More Want to Discover Moral Truth? Part 2 "How to Be a Moral Realist" by R. BoydBefore I start I want to give a shout out to fauxphilnews.wordpress.com a blog which I fancy is one of the cleverest blogs I’ve seen in a while. For those of you who didn’t see (or click on) the link I posted on my fb page, I highly recommend you check it out. Oh, I should […]
Read More Want to Discover Moral Truth? Part 1 "How to Be a Moral Realist" by R. BoydNotes and Thoughts on J. L. Mackie’s Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong; The Subjectivity of ValuesRecapSo, what were we talkin’ ’bout? Ah! yes, that there are no objective moral values. Let’s look a little more closely at what that might mean…Standards of EvaluationWhat might it mean to say there are no objective moral values? One […]
Read More Objective Moral Values Don’t Exist: J. L. Mackie Part 2Mackie on Objectivity/SubjectivityMackie’s Arguments from Relativity and Queerness Notes and Thoughts on J. L. Mackie’s Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Part 1IntroMackie represents the position in meta-ethics known a moral skepticism. As you may have guessed, his position is typified by a strong belief in a god and objective moral values. Jk. lol. Actually, moral skepticism […]
Read More Objective Moral Values Don’t Exist: Mackie Part 1The Case for EmotivismRecapIn part 1 we looked at Ayer’s arguments against the idea that any value assertion (e.g. “x is good/right/bad”) by subjectivism, utilitarianism, or absolutism is not reducible to any testable claim, and is therefore meaningless, except as expressions of emotions of approval or disapproval. So, for example, if I say “premarital sex is baaaaaaaaaaaad” […]
Read More Hurrah/Boo Theory of Ethics: A. J. Ayer Part 2
Wrestling with Philosophy 